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408 PEOPLE v. REED. [17 C. (2d) 
the deceased's cabin. Shortly thereafter Williams disap-
peared. His clothes were found on the bank of the Colorado 
River near Crossroads, and his body was recovered from the 
river in an identifiable condition. At the trial the testi-
mony given by him at the preliminary hearing was read into 
the record. 
The foregoing facts constitute evidence which, even though 
circumstantial, is substantial enough to have established the 
guilt of the two defendants in the minds of the jury. 
[2] Defendants contend that the district attorney was 
guilty of prejudicial misconduct at the trial in questioning 
Reed as to whether or not he had been previously convicted 
of a felony. On cross-examination Reed was asked whether 
or not he had been convicted of stealing government prop-
erty and sentenced under that conviction. The court per-
mitted the question over objection by counsel for the de-
fendants, and Reed answered "no". At the conclusion of 
the testimony in the case the district attorney stated that 
when he had asked the question regarding a prior convic-
tion, he had asked it in good faith, expecting to be able to 
prove the conviction by documentary evidence, but that such 
evidence was not available, and he therefore requested that :, 
the matter be expunged from the record and the jury in-
structed to disregard the question. The court complied with 
the request. In view of this subsequent statement by the 
district attorney, the expunging of the matter from the record 
by the court in compliance with the district attorney's re-
quest, and the absence of any evidence of bad faith on the 
part of the district attorney, there is no prejudicial miscon-
duct requiring a reversal. (People v. Braun, 14 Cal. (2d) 1 
[92 Pac. (2d) 402].) 
The judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed. 
Feb. 1941.] LONG V. LONG. 409 
[So F. No. 15969. Department Two.-February 19, 1941.] 
LOUIS A. LONG, Respondent, V. MARGARET C. LONG, 
Appellant. 
[I] Divorce and Separation-Permanent Alimony-Modification 
of Allowance-Effect of Absence of Alimony Provision in De-
cree.-A court which has provided for alimony payments for 
a definite term without reserving the right to change or modify 
the term is without power to make further allowance for the 
wife's support after such alimony has been paid and the final 
decree has been entered. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County, setting aside an order modifying an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce. William F. James, Judge. Affirmed. 
David M. Burnett and John M. Burnett for Appellant.' 
Henry E. Monroe and Henriette W. Steinegger for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On January 7, 1930, the Superior Court 
of Santa Clara County awarded appellant Margaret C. Long 
an interlocutory decree of divorce against respondent Louis 
A. Long directing him to pay appellant $50 a month alimony 
for the six months from February 5, 1930, to and including 
July 5, 1930. This alimony was duly paid. The final decree 
of divorce, entered on March 30, 1931, neither awarded ali-
mony to appellant nor reserved to the court jurisdiction 
thereafter to make an allowance for appellant's support. 
On November 10, 1931, on application of appellant supported 
by an affidavit averring that because of injury she was no 
longer able to support herself, the court after a hearing made 
an order modifying the interlocutory decree of divorce by 
requiring respondent to pay $50 a month alimony thence-
forth until further order of the court. On December 20, 
1. Power to reopen decree of divorce which is silent as to or 
expressly provides against alimony so as to permit modification 
in that regard, note, 83 A. L. R. 1248. See, also, 1 Cal. Jur. 1035; 
17 Am. JUl'. 494. 
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1935, the court entered an order granting respondent's mo-
tion to set aside the order of November 10, 1931, upon the 
ground that the attempt to modify the interlocutory decree 
of January 7, 1930, was without jurisdiction and void. The 
present appeal is taken from this order. 
Section 139 of the Civil Code provides: "Where a divorce 
is granted for an offense of the husband, the Court may com-
pel him to provide for the maintenance of the children of 
the marriage, and to make such suitable allowance to the 
wife for her support, during her life or for a shorter period 
as the Court may deem just, having regard to the circum-
stances of the parties respectively; and the Court may from 
time to time modify its order in these respects." [1] Ap-
pellant, relying on Smith v. Superior Oourt, 89 Cal. App. 
177 [264 Pac. 573], and Bechtel v. Bechtel, 124 Cal. App. 617 
[12 Pac. (2d) 970], contends that the above section confers on 
the court an express power to modify an alimony decree even 
though the alimony was awarded for a limited time, which 
has expired, and the decree did not contain a reservation of 
jurisdiction. 
This contention is answered adversely and the authorities 
relied on are distinguished in Tolle v. Superior Oourt, 10 Cal. 
(2d) 95 [73 Pac. (2d) 607], which holds that if the court 
provides for alimony payments for a definite term without re-
serving the right to change or modify the term, the court has 
no power to make further allowance for the wife's support 
after such alimony has been paid and the final decree has 
been entered. 
The order is affirmed. 




Feb. 1941.] S. A. GERRARD CO. v. INDUSTRIAL Acc. COM. 411 
[L. A. No. 17668. In Bank.-February 19, 1941.] 
THE S. A. GERRARD COMPANY ea Corporation) et al., 
Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS-
SION, MACERIO VALDEZ et al., Respondents. 
[1] Independent Contractors-Introductory-Deiinitions.-An in-
dependent contractor is one who renders service in the course 
of an independent employment or occupation, following his 
employer's desires only in the result of the work, and not the 
means whereby it is to be accomplished. 
[2] Id. - Existence of Relationship - Supervision of Work by 
Owner and Factor.-The relationship of the employer and em-
ployee exists whenever the employer obtains the right to direct 
how the work shall be done as well as the results to be ac-
complished, that is to say, when he retains the right to exer-
cise complete or authoritative control, rather than the right 
to make mere suggestions as to detail. It is the right to 
control, rather than the amount of control exercised, that is 
the determinative factor. 
[3] Workmen's Compensation-Certiorari-Findings on Conflict-
ing Evidence-Relationship of Employer and Employee.-If 
there is a substantial conflict in the evidence regarding the 
status as employee of the person claiming compensation, the 
finding of the Industrial Accident Commission will not be dis-
turbed. 
[4] Id.-Persons Entitled to Compensation-Employees-Persons 
Embraced by Terms - In General- Cropper. - Where one 
leased land for the purpose of growing melons and under 
a contract with the lessor was to plant and pick the crop 
in accordance with the latter's direction, and where the 
latter's right of control of operations extended to all the 
persons who worked in picking and raising the crops, the 
lessee, though in form an independent contractor, was in effect 
an employee. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding compensation for personal in-
juries. Award affirmed. 
1. Circumstances under which existence of relationship of em-
ployer and independent contract is predicable, note, 19 A. L. R. 
1168. See, also, 27 Cal. Jur. 283; 28 R. C. L. 762. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Independent Contractors, § 1; 2. In-
dependent Contractors, § 6; 3. Workmen's Compensation, § 273 
(3); 4. Workmen's Compensation, § 41 (1). 
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